The Five-Layer TCP/IP Model: Description/Attacks/Defense
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Revision as of 02:17, 23 March 2008
Application layer
Description: The application layer is used by most programs for network communication. Data is passed from the program in an application-specific format, then encapsulated into a transport layer protocol.
Since the IP stack has no layers between the application and transport layers, the application layer must include any protocols that act like the OSI's presentation and session layer protocols. This is usually done through libraries.
Data sent over the network is passed into the application layer where it is encapsulated into the application layer protocol. From there, the data is passed down into the lower layer protocol of the transport layer.
The two most common end-to-end protocols are TCP and UDP. Common servers have specific ports assigned to them (HTTP has port 80; Telnet has port 23; etc.) while clients use ephemeral ports. Some protocols, such as File Transfer Protocol and Telnet may set up a session using a well-known port, but then redirect the actual user session to ephemeral ports.
Routers and switches do not utilize this layer but bandwidth throttling applications do, as with the Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP).
An example of an attack:
SQL injection:
SQL injection is a technique that exploits a security vulnerability occurring in the database layer of an application. The vulnerability is present when user input is either incorrectly filtered for string literal escape characters embedded in SQL statements or user input is not strongly typed and thereby unexpectedly executed. It is in fact an instance of a more general class of vulnerabilities that can occur whenever one programming or scripting language is embedded inside another.
Take a simple login page where a legitimate user would enter his username and password combination to enter a secure area to view his personal details or upload his comments in a forum.
When the legitimate user submits his details, an SQL query is generated from these details and submitted to the database for verification. If valid, the user is allowed access. In other words, the web application that controls the login page will communicate with the database through a series of planned commands so as to verify the username and password combination. On verification, the legitimate user is granted appropriate access.
Through SQL Injection, the hacker may input specifically crafted SQL commands with the intent of bypassing the login form barrier and seeing what lies behind it. This is only possible if the inputs are not properly sanitised (i.e., made invulnerable) and sent directly with the SQL query to the database. SQL Injection vulnerabilities provide the means for a hacker to communicate directly to the database.
The technologies vulnerable to this attack are dynamic script languages including ASP, ASP.NET, PHP, JSP, and CGI. All an attacker needs to perform an SQL Injection hacking attack is a web browser, knowledge of SQL queries and creative guess work to important table and field names. The sheer simplicity of SQL Injection has fuelled its popularity.
A way to defense:
A network-based intrusion detection (IDS) tool such as Snort can be set up to detect certain types of SQL injection and XSS attacks as they occur. Snort actually has a default rule set that contains signatures for detecting these intrusions. However, they can be easily bypassed by an attacker, mainly by converting the malicious input string into its hex-encoded value.
Transport layer
Description: The transport layer's responsibilities include end-to-end message transfer capabilities independent of the underlying network, along with error control, fragmentation and flow control. End to end message transmission or connecting applications at the transport layer can be categorized as either:
1. connection-oriented e.g. TCP 2. connectionless e.g UDP
The transport layer can be thought of literally as a transport mechanism e.g. a vehicle whose responsibility is to make sure that its contents (passengers/goods) reach its destination safely and soundly, unless a higher or lower layer is responsible for safe delivery.
The transport layer provides this service of connecting applications together through the use of ports. Since IP provides only a best effort delivery, the transport layer is the first layer of the TCP/IP stack to offer reliability. Note that IP can run over a reliable data link protocol such as the High-Level Data Link Control (HDLC). Protocols above transport, such as RPC, also can provide reliability.
An example of an attack:
Port Scan Attack:
A Port Scan is one of the most popular reconnaissance techniques attackers use to discover services they can break into. All machines connected to a network run many services that use TCP or UDP ports. A port scan helps the attacker find which ports are available. Essentially, a port scan consists of sending a message to each port, one at a time. The kind of response received indicates whether the port is used and can therefore be probed further for weakness.
A way to defense:
Placing a NIDS on the outside of the external firewall will give an early warning advantage, as it should enable the administrator to detect the port scans that typically indicate the start of hacker activity. However, not all scans will be followed by an actual attack, as the hacker may determine that the network currently has no weaknesses that they can exploit. This could lead to large number of alerts that do not require attention. One common yet dangerous effect of this is that the staff may lose faith in the IDS and start ignoring alerts. External firewall can be used to provide alerts for the traffic that it has denied. By placing NIDS inside the DMZ (De-Militarized Zone, a part of the network that is neither "inside" nor "outside" the corporate entity) the advantage that could be taken is that the tailoring of NIDS attack signature database can be done to consider only those attacks that are applicable to the systems in the DMZ; at the same time the firewall will have blocked all other traffic.
Network layer
Description: Network layer solves the problem of getting packets across a single network. Examples of such protocols are X.25, and the ARPANET's Host/IMP Protocol.
With the advent of the concept of internetworking, additional functionality was added to this layer, namely getting data from the source network to the destination network. This generally involves routing the packet across a network of networks, known as an internetwork or (lower-case) internet.[7]
In the Internet protocol suite, IP performs the basic task of getting packets of data from source to destination. IP can carry data for a number of different upper layer protocols; these protocols are each identified by a unique protocol number: ICMP and IGMP are protocols 1 and 2, respectively.
Some of the protocols carried by IP, such as ICMP (used to transmit diagnostic information about IP transmission) and IGMP (used to manage IP Multicast data) are layered on top of IP but perform internetwork layer functions, illustrating an incompatibility between the Internet and the IP stack and OSI model. All routing protocols, such as OSPF, and RIP are also part of the network layer. What makes them part of the network layer is that their payload is totally concerned with management of the network layer. The particular encapsulation of that payload is irrelevant for layering purposes.
An example of an attack:
Denial of Service attack - SYN Flooding:
The basis of the SYN flooding attack lies in the design of the 3-way handshake that begins a TCP connection. In this handshake, the third packet verifies the initiator's ability to receive packets at the IP address it used as the source in its initial request, or its return reachability. Figure 1 shows the sequence of packets exchanged at the beginning of a normal TCP connection.
The Transmission Control Block (TCB) is a transport protocol data structure (actually a set of structures in many operations systems) that holds all the information about a connection. The memory footprint of a single TCB depends on what TCP options and other features an implementation provides and has enabled for a connection. Usually, each TCB exceeds at least 280 bytes, and in some operating systems currently takes more than 1300 bytes. The TCP SYN-RECEIVED state is used to indicate that the connection is only half open, and that the legitimacy of the request is still in question. The important aspect to note is that the TCB is allocated based on reception of the SYN packet— before the connection is fully established or the initiator's return reachability has been verified.
This situation leads to a clear potential DoS attack where incoming SYNs cause the allocation of so many TCBs that a host's kernel memory is exhausted. In order to avoid this memory exhaustion, operating systems generally associate a "backlog" parameter with a listening socket that sets a cap on the number of TCBs simultaneously in the SYN-RECEIVED state. Although this action protects a host's available memory resource from attack, the backlog itself represents another (smaller) resource vulnerable to attack. With no room left in the backlog, it is impossible to service new connection requests until some TCBs can be reaped or otherwise removed from the SYN-RECEIVED state.
Depleting the backlog is the goal of the TCP SYN flooding attack, which attempts to send enough SYN segments to fill the entire backlog. The attacker uses source IP addresses in the SYNs that are not likely to trigger any response that would free the TCBs from the SYN-RECEIVED state. Because TCP attempts to be reliable, the target host keeps its TCBs stuck in SYN-RECEIVED for a relatively long time before giving up on the half connection and reaping them. In the meantime, service is denied to the application process on the listener for legitimate new TCP connection initiation requests. Figure 2 presents a simplification of the sequence of events involved in a TCP SYN flooding attack.
A way to defense:
Both end-host and network-based solutions to the SYN flooding attack have merits. Both types of defense are frequently employed, and they generally do not interfere when used in combination. Because SYN flooding targets end hosts rather than attempting to exhaust the network capacity, it seems logical that all end hosts should implement defenses, and that network-based techniques are an optional second line of defense that a site can employ.
End-host mechanisms are present in current versions of most common operating systems. Some implement SYN caches, others use SYN cookies after a threshold of backlog usage is crossed, and still others adapt the SYN-RECEIVED timer and number of retransmission attempts for SYN-ACKs.
Because some techniques are known to be ineffective (increasing backlogs and reducing the SYN-RECEIVED timer), these techniques should definitely not be relied upon. Based on experimentation and analysis (and the author's opinion), SYN caches seem like the best end-host mechanism available.
This choice is motivated by the facts that they are capable of withstanding heavy attacks, they are free from the negative effects of SYN cookies, and they do not need any heuristics for threshold setting as in many hybrid approaches.
Among network-based solutions, there does not seem to be any strong argument for SYN-ACK spoofing firewall/proxies. Because these spoofing proxies split the TCP connection, they may disable some high-performance or other TCP options, and there seems to be little advantage to this approach over ACK-spoofing firewall/proxies. Active monitors should be used when a firewall/proxy solution is administratively impossible or too expensive to deploy. Ingress and egress filtering is frequently done today (but not ubiquitous), and is a commonly accepted practice as part of being a good neighbor on the Internet. Because filtering does not cope with distributed networks of drones that use direct attacks, it needs to be supplemented with other mechanisms, and must not be relied upon by an end host.
Data link layer
Description: The link layer, which is the method used to move packets from the network layer on two different hosts, is not really part of the Internet protocol suite, because IP can run over a variety of different link layers. The processes of transmitting packets on a given link layer and receiving packets from a given link layer can be controlled both in the software device driver for the network card, as well as on firmware or specialist chipsets. These will perform data link functions such as adding a packet header to prepare it for transmission, then actually transmit the frame over a physical medium.
For Internet access over a dial-up modem, IP packets are usually transmitted using PPP. For broadband Internet access such as ADSL or cable modems, PPPoE is often used. On a local wired network, Ethernet is usually used, and on local wireless networks, IEEE 802.11 is usually used. For wide-area networks, either PPP over T-carrier or E-carrier lines, Frame relay, ATM, or packet over SONET/SDH (POS) are often used.
An example of an attack:
Media Access Control (MAC) Address spoofing:
MAC spoofing attacks involve the use of a known MAC address of another host to attempt to make the target switch forward frames destined for the remote host to the network attacker. By sending a single frame with the other host's source Ethernet address, the network attacker overwrites the CAM table entry so that the switch forwards packets destined for the host to the network attacker. Until the host sends traffic it will not receive any traffic. When the host sends out traffic, the CAM table entry is rewritten once more so that it moves back to the original port.
A way to defense:
The best way to protect against MAC spoofing is for an intelligent WLAN system to automatically detect MAC spoofing attacks and exclude offending machines from attaching to the WLAN. This is done in several ways:
Detection and Containment - One way to prevent MAC spoofing attacks is to flag any occurrence in which the manufacturer name of a detected WLAN adapter differs from the known OUI (Organizationally Unique Identifier) for that equipment. Once detected, an intelligent WLAN system can prevent the known attacker from connecting to any nearby APs or any APs located throughout the entire WLAN.
Physical layer
Description: The Physical layer is responsible for encoding and transmission of data over network communications media. It operates with data in the form of bits that are sent from the Physical layer of the sending (source) device and received at the Physical layer of the destination device.
Ethernet, Token Ring, SCSI, hubs, repeaters, cables and connectors are standard network devices that function at the Physical layer. The Physical layer is also considered the domain of many hardware-related network design issues, such as LAN and WAN topology and wireless technology.
An example of an attack:
There is not much to be said about the attack on this layer. Some one can physically take away your network card or unplug your internet cable.
A way to defense:
Don't let people touch your computer :)
