Electronic Voting Systems - Revision history

Kopyloe: /* Insider Attacks */

2007-12-09T23:45:12Z

Insider Attacks

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:45, 9 December 2007
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	<br>'''Ex. 1.''' A software developer can change a single line of code to give 10% of all votes to a desired party.		<br>'''Ex. 1.''' A software developer can change a single line of code to give 10% of all votes to a desired party.
	<br>'''Ex. 2.''' A programmer working on the system can change the ordering of candidates in the 'ballot definition' file but keep the original order in the 'result file'; therefore		<br>'''Ex. 2.''' A programmer working on the system can change the ordering of candidates in the 'ballot definition' file but keep the original order in the 'result file'; therefore
-	<br> the reordered list will appear on the DRE screen and voters will unwillingly cast votes for wrong candidates.	+	<br> the reordered list will appear on the DRE screen and voters will unwillingly cast votes for wrong candidates.
-		+
-	~~'''Internet'''~~	+
-		+
-	~~Attacks over the internet may vary from Spoofing, Denial of Services, Malicious code, Fishing and Social Engineering~~.	+

	==Outsider Attacks==		==Outsider Attacks==

Kopyloe: /* Security Implementations and Certification */

2007-12-09T23:44:54Z

Security Implementations and Certification

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:44, 9 December 2007
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	<br>the voter becomes completely separated from the vote once the votes are sent for counting. Other methods of improving i-voting are Secure Socket Layers and more implementations of Public Key Cryptography.		<br>the voter becomes completely separated from the vote once the votes are sent for counting. Other methods of improving i-voting are Secure Socket Layers and more implementations of Public Key Cryptography.

-	[[Image:evoting.jpg \| 400 px]]	+	[[Image:evoting.jpg \| 400 px]]

	New implementations of security for DRE machines are introduced at every election, though attacks still slip through from unexpected angles. One of the most common ways to check for the integrity of votes		New implementations of security for DRE machines are introduced at every election, though attacks still slip through from unexpected angles. One of the most common ways to check for the integrity of votes

Kopyloe: /* Insider Attacks */

2007-12-09T23:42:02Z

Insider Attacks

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:42, 9 December 2007
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	'''Internet'''		'''Internet'''

-	Attacks over the internet may vary from Spoofing, Denial of Services, Malicious code, Fishing and Social Engineering.	+	Attacks over the internet may vary from Spoofing, Denial of Services, Malicious code, Fishing and Social Engineering.
-		+
-	~~<br>'''Ex. 1.'''~~	+

	==Outsider Attacks==		==Outsider Attacks==

Kopyloe: /* References */

2007-12-09T23:37:01Z

References

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:37, 9 December 2007
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	# TADAYOSHI KOHNO, ADAM S TUBBLEFIELD, AVIEL D. RUBIN, DAN S. WALLACH. "Analysis of an Electronic Voting System." EEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2004 February 27, 2004 1-32. 08 Dec 2007 <avirubin.com/vote.pdf>.		# TADAYOSHI KOHNO, ADAM S TUBBLEFIELD, AVIEL D. RUBIN, DAN S. WALLACH. "Analysis of an Electronic Voting System." EEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2004 February 27, 2004 1-32. 08 Dec 2007 <avirubin.com/vote.pdf>.
	# Internet Voting Picture. Abbas Alfaraj. 9 Dec 2007 <aalfaraj.com/Dcouments/Voting_over_Internet.pdf>		# Internet Voting Picture. Abbas Alfaraj. 9 Dec 2007 <aalfaraj.com/Dcouments/Voting_over_Internet.pdf>
		+	# Alfaraj, Abbas. "Electronic Remote Voting Over Internet." Information Security UCL, Network Security. 9 Dec 2007 <aalfaraj.com/Dcouments/Voting_over_Internet.pdf>.

	__NOTOC__		__NOTOC__

Kopyloe: /* Security Implementations and Certification */

2007-12-09T23:34:04Z

Security Implementations and Certification

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:34, 9 December 2007
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	<br>from tempering with the votes or securing a network connection from other attacks. If a voter casts a vote from a remote location, in most cases the computer must be in 'safe mode' booted from a provided CD-ROM or		<br>from tempering with the votes or securing a network connection from other attacks. If a voter casts a vote from a remote location, in most cases the computer must be in 'safe mode' booted from a provided CD-ROM or
	<br>have an attached device in order to run on a secured voting platform. The casted vote must be encrypted and sent to the vote server, the unencrypted copy is then deleted off the voters computer. The identification of		<br>have an attached device in order to run on a secured voting platform. The casted vote must be encrypted and sent to the vote server, the unencrypted copy is then deleted off the voters computer. The identification of
-	<br>the voter becomes completely separated from the vote once the votes are sent for counting.	+	<br>the voter becomes completely separated from the vote once the votes are sent for counting. Other methods of improving i-voting are Secure Socket Layers and more implementations of Public Key Cryptography.

	[[Image:evoting.jpg \| 400 px]]		[[Image:evoting.jpg \| 400 px]]

Kopyloe: /* Insider Attacks */

2007-12-09T23:32:44Z

Insider Attacks

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:32, 9 December 2007
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	'''Internet'''		'''Internet'''

-	~~Since there is less human involvement~~ over internet ~~voting~~, ~~the only serious insider attack may be caused by Election officials who are in charge~~ of ~~the networking~~, ~~the operating system~~	+	Attacks over the internet may vary from Spoofing, Denial of Services, Malicious code, Fishing and Social Engineering.
-	~~<br>~~ and ~~hardware~~.	+

	<br>'''Ex. 1.'''		<br>'''Ex. 1.'''

Kopyloe: /* References */

2007-12-09T23:27:33Z

References

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:27, 9 December 2007
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	# Bellis, Mary . "The History of Voting Machines." Inventors. 2007. 8 Dec 2007 <http://inventors.about.com/library/weekly/aa111300b.htm>.		# Bellis, Mary . "The History of Voting Machines." Inventors. 2007. 8 Dec 2007 <http://inventors.about.com/library/weekly/aa111300b.htm>.
	# TADAYOSHI KOHNO, ADAM S TUBBLEFIELD, AVIEL D. RUBIN, DAN S. WALLACH. "Analysis of an Electronic Voting System." EEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2004 February 27, 2004 1-32. 08 Dec 2007 <avirubin.com/vote.pdf>.		# TADAYOSHI KOHNO, ADAM S TUBBLEFIELD, AVIEL D. RUBIN, DAN S. WALLACH. "Analysis of an Electronic Voting System." EEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2004 February 27, 2004 1-32. 08 Dec 2007 <avirubin.com/vote.pdf>.
-		+	# Internet Voting Picture. Abbas Alfaraj. 9 Dec 2007 <aalfaraj.com/Dcouments/Voting_over_Internet.pdf>

	__NOTOC__		__NOTOC__

Kopyloe: /* Security Implementations and Certification */

2007-12-09T23:23:12Z

Security Implementations and Certification

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:23, 9 December 2007
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	<br>the voter becomes completely separated from the vote once the votes are sent for counting.		<br>the voter becomes completely separated from the vote once the votes are sent for counting.

-	[[Image:evoting.jpg \| ~~300~~ px]]	+	[[Image:evoting.jpg \| 400 px]]

	New implementations of security for DRE machines are introduced at every election, though attacks still slip through from unexpected angles. One of the most common ways to check for the integrity of votes		New implementations of security for DRE machines are introduced at every election, though attacks still slip through from unexpected angles. One of the most common ways to check for the integrity of votes

Kopyloe: /* Security Implementations and Certification */

2007-12-09T23:22:59Z

Security Implementations and Certification

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:22, 9 December 2007
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	<br>the voter becomes completely separated from the vote once the votes are sent for counting.		<br>the voter becomes completely separated from the vote once the votes are sent for counting.

-	[[Image:evoting.jpg \| ~~200~~ px]]	+	[[Image:evoting.jpg \| 300 px]]

	New implementations of security for DRE machines are introduced at every election, though attacks still slip through from unexpected angles. One of the most common ways to check for the integrity of votes		New implementations of security for DRE machines are introduced at every election, though attacks still slip through from unexpected angles. One of the most common ways to check for the integrity of votes

Kopyloe at 23:22, 9 December 2007

2007-12-09T23:22:42Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:22, 9 December 2007
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	<br>the voter becomes completely separated from the vote once the votes are sent for counting.		<br>the voter becomes completely separated from the vote once the votes are sent for counting.

-	[[Image:evoting.jpg]]	+	[[Image:evoting.jpg \| 200 px]]

	New implementations of security for DRE machines are introduced at every election, though attacks still slip through from unexpected angles. One of the most common ways to check for the integrity of votes		New implementations of security for DRE machines are introduced at every election, though attacks still slip through from unexpected angles. One of the most common ways to check for the integrity of votes